# ASU Cards Round 1 Fullerton

### 1

#### Interpretation and violation --- the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government action

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### C. Best for fairness.

#### 1. Plan focus is the only predictable way of affirming the resolution. Philosophical and theoretical concerns certainly play into the ways that policies are made, but the resolution only calls for us to defend and/or question political-institutional implementations of these kinds of concerns.

#### 2. Plan focus is the only way to ensure a fair division of ground. The affirmative has the advantage of trying to solve the most heinous problems of the status quo—without plan focus, debates devolve into whether or not things like racism, sexism, classism, or homophobia are good or bad. While problems are often less contestable, solutions to these problems are—we can debate about whether or not a particular proposal will fix or worsen these problems and proffer our own solutions.

#### D. Best for education

#### No solvency for their critique without institutional focus. We must try to change policy in order to change the world—the concentration of power in the hands of political elites is inevitable, so we must work within that system to check oppression and violence.

Themba-Nixon 2k [Makani, Executive Director of the Praxis Project, *Colorlines* 3.2, pg. 12]

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

### 2

#### 1. Embracing “experience” as the basis for epistemology ignores the mediated nature of experience. Experience is just another site for articulating the dominant ideology because it ignores the historical continuity of class domination in favor of a “local” understanding of oppression.

Young 6 (Robert, Red Critique, Winter/Spring, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>)

Bourgeois philosophical assumptions haunt the Afrocentric project and, in the domain of black feminist theory, Patricia Hill Collins provides an instructive example of this intersection. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins posits the "special angle of vision" that black women bring to knowledge production process (21), and this "unique angle" (22) provides the "standpoint" for Afrocentric feminism, a feminism that she equates with humanism (37). Similar to the experiential metaphysics of Black women's standpoint theory, Collins also situates Afrocentric feminist epistemology "in the everyday experiences of African-American women" (207). Consequently, Collins suggests that "concrete experience" constitutes a criterion of meaning (208). However, the experiential, the "real", does not adequate the "truth", as Collins implies. Collins rejects the "Eurocentric Masculinist Knowlege Validation Process" for its positivism but, in turn, she offers empiricism as the grounds for validating experience. Hence, the validity of experiential claims is adjudicated by reference to the experience. Not only is her argument circular, but it also undermines one of her key claims. If race, class, gender, and the accompanying ideological apparatuses are interlocking systems of oppression, as Collins suggest, then the experiential is not the site for the "true" but rather the site for the articulation of dominant ideology. On what basis then, could the experiential provide grounds for an historical understanding of the structures that make experience itself possible as experience? Asante and Collins assume that experience is self-intelligible and in their discourse it functions as the limit text of the real. However, I believe experience is a highly mediated frame of understanding. Though it is true that a person of color experiences oppression, this experience is not self-explanatory and, therefore, it needs to be situated in relation to other social practices. Experience seems local but it is, like all cultural and political practices, interrelated to other practices and experiences. Thus its explanation come from its "outside". Theory, specifically Marxist theory, provides an explanation of this outside by reading the meaning of all experiences as determined by the economic realities of class. While Asante's and Collins' humanism reads the experience of race as a site of "self-presence", the history of race in the United States—from slavery to Jim Crow to Katrina—is written in the fundamental difference of class. In other words, experience does not speak the real, but rather it is the site of contradictions and, hence, in need of conceptual elaboration to break from cultural common sense, a conduit for dominant ideology. It is this outside that has come under attack by black (humanist) scholars through the invocation of the black (transcendental) subject.

#### 2. Identity politics necessarily sustain the regular functioning of capitalism – identity formation is the process by which capitalism divides the working class to make resistance impossible.  This guarantees that political demands are not elevated past the level of particularism and reaching the level of the bourgeoisie becomes the ultimate objective.

Brown 93 (Wendy, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, “Wounded Attachments” Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 392-395, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795)

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thouroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Froucault, respectively, reveal as liveralism’s compainion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relativley minimalist “night watchman” state to a heavily bureacratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureacracy. On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demographic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism’s marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mobilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic arry of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alchoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normalizing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls “an anatomy of detail,” “disciplinary power” produces social identities (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridicial identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state’s production of welfare subjects – themselves subdivided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age and so forth – potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as the these categories*.* In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal – the transparent fiction of state universality – combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary productions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest – a conversion that recasts politicized identity’s substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism’s production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practicies. As liberal discourse converts politcal identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politicially neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism poltiically neutralize rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity cliams to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of progressive formulations of power and person – all of which they also are – but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment – class resentment without class consiousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resentments, retains the real or imagined holding of its reviled subject – in this case, bourgeois male privileges – as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification though class. They necessarily rather than incidentially abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social independence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alientation, commodificiation, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustain, albeit contradictory, social forms such as familes and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitlism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicity politicized marking.

#### 3. The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### 4. Vote negative to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1NC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### 5. Class divisions are the root of all other oppressions

Kovel 2 (Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away.

### 3

#### In rejection of the War on Terror’s anti-Muslim and Patriarchal exploitation of Muslim Women, we affirm substantial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by advocating for Muslim Women’s self-determination of how they want to be governed

#### The use of the term ‘Islamophobia’ implies a prejudice toward mental illness and levels a variety of different types of oppression, turning any political potential for the 1AC

Richardson 9 (Robin Richardson, Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism – or what? – concepts and terms revisited, London, 2009,

http://www.insted.co.uk/anti-muslim-racism.pdf, da 12-26-13) PC

The disadvantages of the term Islamophobia are significant. Some of them are primarily ¶ about the echoes implicit in the concept of phobia. Others are about the implications of ¶ the term Islam. For convenience, they can be itemised as follows. ¶ ¶ 1. Medically, phobia implies a severe mental illness of a kind that affects only a tiny ¶ minority of people. Whatever else anxiety about Muslims may be, it is not merely ¶ a mental illness and does not merely involve a small number of people. ¶ ¶ 2. To accuse someone of being insane or irrational is to be abusive and, not ¶ surprisingly, to make them defensive and defiant. Reflective dialogue with them is ¶ then all but impossible. ¶ ¶ 3. To label someone with whom you disagree as irrational or insane is to absolve ¶ yourself of the responsibility of trying to understand, both intellectually and with ¶ empathy, why they think and act as they do, and of seeking through engagement ¶ and argument to modify their perceptions and understandings. ¶ ¶ 4. The concept of anxiety is arguably more useful in this context than the concept of ¶ phobia. It is widely recognised that anxiety may not be (though certainly may be) ¶ warranted by objective facts, for human beings can on occasions perceive ¶ dangers that do not objectively exist, or anyway do not exist to the extent that is ¶ imagined. Also it can sometimes be difficult to identify, and therefore to name ¶ accurately, the real sources of an anxiety. ¶ ¶ 5. The use of the word Islamophobia on its own implies that hostility towards ¶ Muslims is unrelated to, and basically dissimilar from, forms of hostility such as ¶ racism, xenophobia, sectarianism, and such as hostility to so-called ¶ fundamentalism (Samuels 2006). Further, it may imply there is no connection ¶ with issues of class, power, status and territory; or with issues of military, ¶ political or economic competition and conflict. ¶ ¶ 6. The term implies there is no important difference between prejudice towards ¶ Muslim communities within one’s own country and prejudice towards cultures and ¶ regimes elsewhere in the world where Muslims are in the majority, and with ¶ which ‘the West’ is in military conflict or economic competition. ¶ ¶ 7. The term is inappropriate for describing opinions that are basically anti-religion as ¶ distinct from anti-Islam. ‘I am an Islamophobe,’ wrote the journalist Polly ¶ Toynbee in reaction to the Runnymede 1997 report, adding ‘… I am also a ¶ Christophobe. If Christianity were not such a spent force in this country, if it were ¶ powerful and dominant as it once was, it would still be every bit as damaging as ¶ Islam is in those theocratic states in its thrall… If I lived in Israel, I'd feel the ¶ same way about Judaism’. ¶ ¶ 8. The key phenomenon to be addressed is arguably anti-Muslim hostility, namely ¶ hostility towards an ethno-religious identity within western countries (including ¶ Russia), rather than hostility towards the tenets or practices of a worldwide ¶ religion. The 1997 Runnymede definition of Islamophobia was ‘a shorthand way of ¶ referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or ¶ most Muslims’. In retrospect, it would have been as accurate, or arguably indeed 5¶ more accurate, to say ‘a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of all or ¶ most Muslims – and, therefore, dread or hatred of Islam’.

#### The alternative is to adopt the term “anti-Muslimism”—that’s a better way to situate our ideological relationship with the Middle East

Saeed, Senior Lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies – University of Sunderland, ‘7

(Amir, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media,” Sociology Compass Volume 1, Issue 2, p. 443-462, November)

Halliday (1996, 160), however, notes that a distinction must be made between Islamophobia and anti-Muslimism The tone of this rhetoric is often alarmist, and encompasses racist, xenophobic and stereotyping elements. The term ‘anti-Muslimism’ is used here to signify such a diffuse ideology, one rarely expressed in purely religious terms but usually mixed in with other rhetoric's and ideologies ... It involves not so much hostility to Islam as a religion ... But hostility to Muslims, to communities of peoples whose sole or main religion is Islam and whose Islamic character, real or invented, forms one of the objects of prejudice. In this sense anti-Muslimism often overlaps with forms of ethnic prejudice, covering peoples within which there may be well a significant non-Muslim element, such as Albanians, Palestinians or even Caucasians. In short, it appears that what Halliday is arguing is that ‘anti-Muslimism’ is almost a new form of racism that discriminates not only on physical traits but also religious characteristics. For Halliday, the term ‘Islamophobia’ is inaccurate because it is too uniform. Halliday (1999) points out that usage of this term implies that there is only one Islam and that all Muslims are homogenous. In short, Halliday (1999, 898) is proposing that Islamophobia as a term suggests fear of Islam as a religion not fear of the people who follow Islam

### Case

#### While Islam in a vacuum might have valiant things to say about women and people, the lived experience of theocracy means that fundamentalism coopts the egalitarian goals of Islamic feminism.

Moghadam 2002 [Valentine M., Department of Sociology at Illinois State University, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate,” in *Signs* 27.4]

Haideh Moghissi complains that “it has become fashionable to speak sympathetically and enthusiastically about the reformist activities of Muslim women, and to insist on their independence of thought. . . . The message is that a new road has been opened up for women—Muslim and non-Muslim alike—to gain equal rights to men: a road based on feminist interpretations of Islamic sharia laws” (Moghissi 1998, 42). This is problematical, she writes, for several reasons. It obscures the fact that in a country like Iran, Islam is not a matter of personal spiritual choice but rather a legal and political system. “Islam in political rule is incompatible with the cultural pluralism that is after all the prerequisite of the right to individual choice” (43). Although critical of those “apologists of the Islamic government and uninformed observers” who attribute legal changes in the Islamic Republic to “the enlightenment of conservative Islamists” (1995, 251), she does not directly claim that there have been no achievements by Islamic feminists in Iran. In fact, she refers to the opportunities afforded to Islamic women and to the accomplishments of the female political elite. Without properly attributing these ideas to previous authors, she notes that the Islamic Republic’s gender ideology faces the imperatives of a capitalist system, which requires sexual desegregation, and that the clerical state tries to accommodate the demands of activist women (1995, 252).16 But then she opines that the “exaggerated reports” about recent legal gains by women, and the role of Islamic feminists in bringing them about, divert attention away from societal opposition to the economic, social, and cultural conditions brought about by nearly two decades of Islamization. It serves to strengthen the legitimacy of the Islamic system in Iran and “weakens the struggle of women inside Iran” (Moghissi 1998, 43). She does not explain how this occurs. A central point is that the term Islamic feminist has been used in “inaccurate” and “irresponsible” ways. Almost all Islamic and active women are designated Islamic feminist, Moghissi asserts, “even though their activities might not even fit the broadest definition of feminism” (1998, 42). Although she herself does not define feminism, Moghissi complains that the term Islamic feminism encompasses members of the female political elite who believe in the Sharia and its prescribed gender rights and roles, such as three former female parliamentarians who were responsible for two reactionary bills. Another criticism is that the term and the emphasis on the achievements of those believing women who reinterpret the Qur’an obscure the political, ideological, and religious differences among Iranian women and mask the valiant efforts of socialists, democrats, and feminists to work toward secularism (Moghissi 1997).17 In her 1999 book, which is largely a collection of previously published essays, she writes of “the masterful manipulation of observers by the fundamentalists” (104). As in her Persian-language article, Moghissi singles out expatriate feminist authors, finds faults with their analyses, and labels them. But whereas in her Kankash article she deemed them “neoconservative,” in her book she brands them “postmodernists” and “cultural relativists.” She writes, “Charmed by ‘difference’ and secure from the bitter fact of the fundamentalist regime, outsiders do them [Iranian women and men] a disservice by clinging to the illusion of an Islamic path” (1999, 121).18

#### Islamic feminism blunts the critical edge of secular movements of Arab women, reifies repressive deployments of Islam, and reinforces the oppression of alternative sexualities.

Moghadam 2002 [Valentine M., Department of Sociology at Illinois State University, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate,” in *Signs* 27.4]

Hammed Shahidian similarly argues that the politics of “Islamic feminism” is problematical, whether in Iran or elsewhere. Like Moghissi, he argues that the emphasis on the achievements of Islamic women obscures the contributions of the left and secularists in the face of continued Islamist repression in Iran. (Ironically, Shahidian, like Moghissi, has published essays exceedingly critical of the left.)19 In one article he refers to a “deepening identity crisis” among secular Middle East feminists and approvingly quotes two Iranian left-wing feminists: “Some women have found the pull towards a full or partial reconciliation with Iranian-style fundamentalism stronger. A trend is now developing among some Iranian feminists . . . to stand back and consider Islamic fundamentalism as opposed to stand up and fight against it.” Shahidian adds that “this is a keen prognosis about the emerging conciliatory regard for ‘Islamic feminism,’” and he implies that academic supporters of Islamic feminism have given up the “critical edge” that he finds so appealing in his discipline, sociology (1999, 318). Dismissive of attempts by Arab scholars such as Fatima Mernissi and Aziza Al-Hibri and the Pakistan-born Riffat Hassan to craft a feminist theology and reinterpretation of Islamic texts, Shahidian argues that these attempts are futile, given the strength of conservative, orthodox, traditional, and fundamentalist interpretations, laws, and institutions. He is especially critical of a growing trend in Middle East women’s studies wherein authors justify Muslim women’s veiling, domesticity, moral behavior, and adherence to Islamic precepts as signs of individual choice and identity (Shahidian 1997).20 Even if we do not accept the notion of “false consciousness,” he asks, is it not incumbent on scholars to situate and understand actors’ views and perceptions within the broader social, cultural, political, and economic context? Political repression, cultural conservatism, and the social control of women characterize this context, he notes. For these reasons, Shahidian not only argues that Islamic feminism is an oxymoron but also that it has wider ramifications even beyond the Iranian left and Iranian society. Although he does not elaborate on this point, he asserts that Islamic feminism and its defense “affects the women’s movement and the Left worldwide” (1998b). Shahidian notes that Islamic feminists in Iran have been attentive to and influenced by Western feminism. But he is critical of them for neglecting key issues of sexuality, veiling, and religious law (1998b). His involvement in the debate on Islamic feminism extends to participation in an exchange with Iranian sociologist Nahid Motiee in the pages of Zanan. Shahidian criticizes Motiee’s defense of the family and raises questions about her and other Islamic feminists’ understanding of patriarchy, gender, and sexuality, including homosexuality (1998a).21 He concludes that Islamic feminism fails to offer a liberating alternative to the dominant Islamic discourse and practice of gender and sexuality.

## 2NC

### Cap K

#### Material conditions determine the relationships people enter into so a failure to engage capitalism guarantees the aff is ineffective.

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

#### They misdiagnose the root cause for the grievances of Islamism. It’s not born out of a clash between East and West but rather political Islamism has spawned to combat the crises of global capitalism. Events like the crusade which spawned the East versus West narrative started as the West’s quest for resources. Their movement also fails in response to global capitalism because Islamists are strong advocates for neoliberalism and capitalism.

Kumar, ‘11

[Deepa, “Political Islam: A Marxist analysis”, International Socialist Review, Issue 78, Slavery and the origins of the Civil War,

<http://isreview.org/issue/78/political-islam-marxist-analysis>, RSR]

In addition to the political crisis that secular nationalism faced, the 1970s saw the emergence of economic crises that state capitalist economic systems were unable to deal with effectively. Additionally, the turn to neoliberalism and the institution of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs meant that various states were no longer able to deal with social welfare needs. It is here that Islamist organizations with their vast charitable networks were able to make inroads. The dynamic can be understood as follows: As a result of structural adjustment, state capacity to co-opt oppositional movements declined and services were increasingly restricted to urban middle class and elite areas. Income distributions polarized. Structural adjustment meant that states were unable to provide previously established levels of services or to ensure adequate supplies of commodities…. The political and moral vacuum opened up great opportunities that were seized by Islamists, who established a social base by offering services that the various states have failed to provide.15 The main recruits to Islamism in the early 1970s were urban educated youth. Between 1955 and 1970, population growth in the Muslim world approached 50 percent.16 By 1975, with urbanization and literacy growing steadily, 60 percent of the population was under the age of twenty-four. While this group, which hailed from families that had recently moved to the cities, had access to education thanks to the reforms instituted by the secular nationalists, they had few opportunities for economic advancement. In some cases, states offered jobs to these new graduates and were able to absorb a section of them into roles as state bureaucrats. Yet, as stated above, even this avenue became tenuous as IMF policies of liberalization and government cuts instituted in countries such as Egypt and Algeria lowered salaries for the intellectual bureaucrat, who then had to find a second job as a taxi driver or night watchman at an international hotel to survive.17 The frustration and political discontent that grew from this situation then led these students toward Islamist ideologies. While many of them had been attracted to nationalism and communism, the failure of these ideologies combined with economic hardship pushed them in the direction of Islamism. A sizable number of these young intellectuals, educated in government schools following a Westernized curriculum, came from the sciences (engineering in particular) or from teachers’ training schools.18 The typical Islamist of this era was an engineer born sometime in the 1950s whose parents were from the country.19 Gulbadin Hikmatyar, the leader of an ultraconservative faction of the Afghan mujahideen, was trained as an engineer; Hacene Hashani, the spokesperson for the Algerian Islamic Salvation Movement (FIS) in 1991, was an oil engineer; and Ayman al-Zawahari of al-Qaeda was trained as a medical doctor. As such this intellectual leadership held a modern urban worldview. Thus, the rise of contemporary political Islam is not the reemergence of a medieval clergy crusading against modernity, but rather a modern urban phenomenon born of the crises created by capitalism.20 As Chris Harman puts it, “Islamism has arisen in societies traumatized by the impact of capitalism—first in the form of external conquest by imperialism and then, increasingly, by the transformation of internal social relations accompanying the rise of a local capitalist class and the formation of an independent state.”21 If the urban, educated youth became the cadre base of the newly emerging Islamist movement, other classes that were threatened by capitalist modernization also drifted towards Islamism. Chief among them is the devout section of the middle class who is another mainstay of the Islamist movement. One section of this middle-class bloc consists of the descendants of the mercantile classes of the bazaars and souks, another of the newly wealthy professionals, flush with money from jobs held in various oil-producing countries.22 The international Islamic banking and financial system spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, discussed above, was able to finance and promote the interests of this middle-class base. If urban-educated youth and the devout middle class are the main forces behind Islamism, other classes also support them. At times, in countries like Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, these two classes have received support and funding from landowning classes whose power was diminished by the nationalists.23 At times, they have also had the backing of the big bourgeoisie. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamists made headway among yet another class—the very poor. This includes people who are either declassed refugees, urban slum-dwellers, or people who are historically oppressed and exploited due to their religion. For instance, Hamas has recruited heavily from the refugee camps created by Israel, and while it has the support of business people, the middle class, merchants and the wealthy, its leadership and cadre are largely drawn from the refugee camps.24 This is true too of Hezbollah, whose mainstay is the Shia poor who live in the outskirts of big cities like Beirut in what is known as the “belt of misery.” Similarly, the Sadrists in Iraq, both in the 1990s and today, draw much of their support and muscle from the slums of Sadr City. The devout middle class, which sometimes has the backing of other sections of society, typically tends to be more conservative in its orientation and constitutes the “moderate” Islamist wing. While they share the vision of creating an Islamic state, they prefer to do so under conditions of social stability that advance their economic interests. The urban youth, on the other hand, displaced from the middle class due to a lack of opportunity, tend to be open to more confrontational and violent tactics; they constitute the “radical” wing of the Islamist movement. At times, these two groups have cooperated with each other, and at other times they have gone their separate ways. Typically, the moderates advocate an Islamization of society from the bottom up through the use of strategies such as preaching and the establishment of social and charitable networks. They also seek to pressure political leaders and enter into political alliances to promote Islamization from the top. They are sometimes open to revolt, but only when all peaceful methods of protest have been exhausted. The radicals, however, advocate the concept of revolution, that is, the forceful overthrow of the existing political regime and its replacement by a radically different system.25 At times, those who begin as moderates get radicalized in the context of political persecution. Thus, Sayyid Qutb, an influential Islamist theoretician who belonged to the moderate Muslim Brotherhood, took a radical turn in 1954 after he was imprisoned and tortured by Nasser’s government. These vacillations are typical of movements led by the petty bourgeoisie because, as a class, it lacks the social weight to bring about effective political and economic changes. Placed in a context of economic crisis, the Islamists often make vague anticapitalist appeals against poverty and greed, and combine it with attacks on “Western values” and imperialism. In reality, however, this is not anticapitalist ideology. With few exceptions, Islamists are in practice strong advocates of capitalism and neoliberalism and therefore cannot offer real solutions to the people who turn to them as a political alternative. In sum, the confluence of several political and economic developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s laid the basis for the growth of political Islam. These include, first, the part played by imperialist nations, particularly the United States, in bolstering the parties of political Islam; second, the failure of secular nationalist movements, and the consequent inability of Stalinist parties to offer an effective alternative; and third, economic crises in various countries that state capitalist methods were unable to resolve and which neoliberalism exacerbated. All of these factors came together at various points and helped to propel Islamism onto the world stage.

#### Our root cause claims are specifically true in the context of the war on terrorism. The core of US Islamophobia groups also control access to the largest amount of money whereby they have shoveled millions of dollars into war on terrorism practices.

Strickland 13 (patrick o. writer for socialist news organizations on Middle East issues, Profiting off islamophobia, http://socialistworker.org/2013/10/09/profiting-off-islamophobia)

The CAIR report identifies 37 groups that constitute what it calls the "inner core" of the U.S. Islamophobia network. Jihad Watch, ACT! For America, Atlas Shrugs and the Investigative Project on Terrorism are among the more influential of these groups.¶ Another 32 groups make up the "outer core"--these include organizations, funds, endowments and radio shows. Some of the best-known mouthpieces of right-wing America make an appearance: the Rush Limbaugh Show, the Mark Levin Show, the Washington Times, Fox News and the Christian Broadcasting Network, to name a few.¶ Sitting at the top of this growing empire is veteran neoconservative commentator Daniel Pipes, who has a long history of issuing sweeping condemnations of all Muslims and is a key financer in the Islamophobia industry. In a period of just three years, Pipes' Middle East Forum has funneled nearly $2 million to just seven groups among the inner core--all of which are known for harsh criticism of Islam and Muslims in general, coupled with staunch support of Israel.¶ Pipes' organization financed Steve Emerson's Investigative Project on Terrorism to the tune of $1.2 million between 2009 and 2011. Emerson made headlines in April following the Boston Marathon bombing when he falsely claimed that a Saudi national was responsible for the attacks.¶ Another noteworthy name is Yigal Carmon, a former Israeli military intelligence officer and founder of Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), a pro-Zionist organization that seeks to paint all Palestinians and Arabs as hatemongers. Pipes' Middle East Forum gave some $450,000 to MEMRI between during the same period.¶ Furthermore, the report found that the 37 organizations, many of which have overlapping high-ranking staff, in the "inner core of America's Islamophobia network enjoyed access to at least $119,662,719 in total revenue between 2008 and 2011."¶ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -¶ THE WAY the network is structured, according to the report, is that the inner-core groups exist for the sole purpose of discriminating against Islam, while the outer core consists of groups that "do not openly appear to include promoting prejudice against or hatred of Islam and Muslims, but whose work regularly demonstrates or supports Islamophobic themes."¶ This highly sophisticated and well-funded edifice has been erected--and continues to be expanded--towards the end of criminalizing Islam and Muslims in the U.S. Furthermore, it demonstrates the extensive overlap of right-wing America, Christian evangelical groups and pro-Zionist organizations.¶ This network serves the purpose of furthering ugly myths about irreconcilable differences between "West" and "East"--divvying up and lumping together tens of millions of people from heterogeneous societies into simplistic categories, disregarding an array of cultural, historical and political factors.¶ This crude Orientalist division of the world into two competing demographics has enabled the U.S. to package its hegemonic expansion and imperial designs in the rhetoric of civilizing missions, freedom and national security. A few of the more horrifying examples are the ongoing occupation of Afghanistan, the recent surveillance scandal at the National Security Agency, the endless U.S. military and financial backing of Israeli apartheid, and the murderous drone program under the auspices of the Obama administration.

#### Capitalism racializes subjects to divide social groups - a cultural and experience based epistemology and theory of oppression breaks down the concept of class as an all encompassing theory of exploitation that is the only way to enable the unification of the proletariat. Empirically this method has been useful in the past during events like Bacon’s Rebellion where poor whites and poor blacks were separated phenotypically in order to prevent an understanding of their similar conditions. Their movement would tell the poor in the West that you cannot join us because you are not like us. You do not know what we’ve been through.

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.11-13, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

The pedagogy of appearance focuses on cultural representation and the role of representation in constructing the represented. By centering teaching in the machinery of "representation,"it obliterates the objective. Reducing pedagogy to lessons in cultural semiotics, it makes "experi- ence" of the pleasures of "depthless" surfaces the measure of reality and thus obscures the social relations of production that are the material conditions of that experience. However, "This 'lived' experience is not a given, given by a pure 'reality,' but the spontaneous 'lived experience' of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real" (Althusser 223). The ideological value of the concept of "experience" in de-concep-ualizing pedagogy will perhaps become more clear in examining the way bourgeois radical pedagogues, such as Giroux, deploy experience as an instance of spontaneity to eviscerate class as an explanatory concept by which the social relations ofproperty are critiqued. In his Impure A cts- a book devoted to marginalizing explanatory concepts and popularizing "hybrids" and that, in effect, justifies political opportunism in peda- gogy- Giroux repeats the claims of such other cultural phenomenologists as Stuart Hall, Judith Butler, and Robin Kelley that "class" is "lived through race" (28). Class, in other words, is an affect. He represents this affective view ofclass as epistemological resistance against class which, he claims, is a universal category that takes the "difference" ofrace out of class. As I have already argued, epistemology is used in mainstream pedagogy as a cover for a reactionary class politics that does several things, as Giroux demonstrates. First, it segregates the "black" proletariat from the "white" proletariat and isolates both :from other "racial" prole- tariats. In doing so, Giroux's pedagogy carries out the political agenda of capital - to pit one segment ofthe proletariat against the other and to tum the unity of the working class into contesting (race) "differences." Second, it rewrites the system of wage labor itself into a hybrid. Giroux's experience-ism obscures the systematicity of wage labor and argues that there is no capitalism operating with a single logic of exploitation. Instead, there are many, aleatory, ad hoc, local arrangements between employees and employers depending on the color of the worker not the laws ofmotion ofcapital. Third, it converts capitalism from an economic system based on the"exploitation"of humans by humans(wagelabor)- through the ownership ofthe means ofproduction-into an institution of cultural "oppression" based on "power." Fourth, since class is lived through race, it is not an objective fact (the relation of the worker to ownership ofthe means ofproduction) but a subjective experience. The experience of ("living") class through race, like all experiences, is contingent, aleatory, and indeterminate. Class (lived through the experi- ence of race) is thus reconstituted as contingent - an accident not a necessity of wage labor. Fifth, since capitalism is not a system but a series of ad hoc arrangements of exchange with various workers of diverse colors, it does not produce an objective binary class system but only cultural differences. One cannot, therefore, obtain objective knowledge of capitalism. There are, in short, no laws ofmotion ofcapital; there are only "experiences" ofwork influenced by one's color. Consequently, to say-as I have said-that capitalism is a regime ofexploitation is simply a totalitarian closure. We cannot know what capitalism is because, according to Giroux's logic, it is fraught with differences (ofrace) not the singularity of"surplus labor." In Giroux's pedagogy, there is no capital- ism ("totality"), only cultural effects of capitals without capitalism ("differences"). Giroux represents his gutting of class as a radical and groundbreaking notion that will lead to liberation ofthe oppressed. However, he never completes the logic of his argument because in the end it will de-ground his position and turn it into epistemological nonsense and political pantomime. Ifclass is a universal category that obliterates the difference of race, there is (on the basis of such a claim) no reason not to say that race is also a universal category because it obliterates the difference of sexuality (and other differences), which is, by the same logic, itself a universal category since it obliterates the difference of age (and other differences), which is itselfa universal category because it obliterates the difference of (dis)ability (and other differences), which is itselfa univer- sal category because it obliterates the difference of class (and other differences). In short, the social, in Giroux's pedagogy is a circle of oppressions, none of whose components can explain any structural relations; each simply absorbs the other ("class is actually lived through race," paraphrasing Giroux) and thus points back to itself as a local knowledge ofthe affective, difference, and contingency. Class explains race; it does not absorb it as an experience (see Butler, "Merely"), nor does i t reduce it to the contingencies o f ethnicities (Hall, "New") or urban performativities (Kelley, Yo '). To put it differently, since in this pluralism of oppressions each element cancels out the explanatory capacity of all others, the existing social relations are reaffirmed in a pragmatic balancing of differences. Nothing changes, everything is resignified. The classroom of experience reduces all concepts (which it marks as "grand narratives") to affects ("little stories") and, instead of explaining the social in order to change it, only "interprets" it as a profusion of differences. Teaching becomes an affirmation of the singular-as-is; its lessons "save the honor of the name" (see Lyotard, Postmodern 82). Giroux's program is a mimesis ofthe logic of the ruling ideology: as in all pedagogies of affect, it redescribes the relation of the subject of knowledge with the world but leaves the world itselfintact byreifying the signs of"difference" (see Rorty, Contingency 53, 73). The subject, as I will discuss later in my analysis ofCary Nelson's radical pedagogy, feels differently about itself in a world that remains what it was. Giroux is putting forth a class-cleansing pedagogy: he erases class from teaching in the name ofepistemology ("totalization"). But as I have already argued, epistemology is not an issue for Giroux; it is an alibi for hollowing out from class its economic explanatory power. Epistemology in bourgeois pedagogy is class politics represented as "theory"-whose aim is to tum class into a cultural aleatory experience. In Giroux's phenomenological experientialism, lived experience is an excuse for advancing the cause of capital in a populist logic (respect for the ineluctable "experience" of the student) so that the student, the future worker, is trained as one who understands the world only through the sense-able - his own "unique" experience as black, white, or brown; man or woman; gay or straight - but never as a proletariat: a person who, regardless of race, sexuality, gender, age, or (dis)ability has to sell his or her labor power to capital in order to obtain subsistence wages in exchange. Experience, in Giroux's pedagogy, becomes a self-protecting "inside" that resists world-historical knowledge as an intrusion from "outside"; it thus valorizes ignorance as a mark of the authenticity and sovereignty ofthe subject-as independence and free choice.

#### Fourth, The labor link – Feminism creates a false conciousness that serves the needs of transnational capitalism by expanding and satisfying its labor force

Cotter 3 (Jennifer, The Red Critique, “The Class Regimen of Contemporary Feminism, http://www.redcritique.org/Spring2003/theclassregimenofcontemporaryfeminism.htm)

It is important to clearly re-state here that the "problem" with excluding the dialectical materialist critique of social totality from feminism is not that feminism does not go "far enough" without it but that, by erasing the relation of women to the mode of production, it actually helps transnational capitalism cover over its "trouble spots", its fundamental contradictions and the economic crises that result from them. The gestures in feminism toward "materialism" and "Marx" without a historical grasping of the social relations of production are ways to help update ruling class ideology and dismantle the revolutionary knowledges necessary to emancipate women from exploitation. Such "updatings" are driven by the needs of transnational capitalism in crisis. Transnational capitalism, to be clear, is increasingly a highly unstable system of production, which requires desperate and violent "solutions" to help try and create "stability" and "equilibrium". Not only does this show up in the daily struggles of workers who are forced to go without basic needs in health care, social security, education… so that the ruling class can fund massive military expenditures in order to protect or gain access to conditions necessary to stave off a decline in profit, it also shows up within the ruling class itself in the form of increased bankruptcies and failed business ventures as wealth gets concentrated into fewer hand. The "root" issue is that the objective structures of private property in capitalism are based on exploitation and the accumulation of socially produced wealth (capital) in the hands of the few and the increased immiseration and impoverishment of the majority. Crisis brought on by the concentration of wealth is endemic to capitalism. As capital accumulates, it becomes increasingly difficult for the ruling class to maintain its rate of profit, in part because the rate at which labor-power must be exploited in order not simply to reproduce existing wealth but to produce new wealth exceeds the historical capabilities of the proletariat. In short, it "overproduces" capital. As a response, capitalists must seek new technologies and labor saving devises and means to raise the productivity of workers and thus increase the rate at which workers can be exploited. In order to stave off falling rates of profit, capital must produce labor-saving technologies, expand production to create new needs (and thus, new sites for profit), and at the same time export capitalist production to new regions where access to reserves of cheap labor can be found. All of this requires a continuous supply of labor-power from which surplus-labor can be extracted. The transnational ruling class, therefore, has every interest in battling over the life conditions of workers of the world in order to control the development and growth of the laboring population and thus, the rate at which it can be exploited. Contemporary feminism has served as a most effective ally of transnational capitalism by helping to inculcate women into the labor needs of transnational capitalism now. The "differences" between the feminists that I have discussed thus far—that is, those such as Probyn who see the "post-" as an enabling condition for women and those such as Rich, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen who see it as disenabling for women—is not all that vast. This is because both positions articulate the labor needs of transnational capitalism. Their "differences" are not fundamental differences over the social relations of production. Rather, they are "differences" that are the effect of these relations of production: the fact that capitalism brings about "uneven development", that its constant quest for profit which requires it to expand production, export capital, etc. also requires that it have both "skilled" and "unskilled" labor. Their "differences", in short, are local differences—specific needs of capital for particular kinds of labor—that are determined by the general need of capitalism for a continuous supply of labor-power that it can exploit for profit. The problem for feminism is not the status of the "post-" (whether feminists are "for" or "against" it; whether women are living under "modernity" or "postmodernity", etc). Rather, it is the private ownership of the means of production that cuts across the local differences in production for women in the international division of labor. For instance, "delectable feminism", with its emphasis on an "ethics" for "care of the self", is especially useful for articulating the labor needs of transnational capitalism in the imperialist nations of the North. In order to turn over a profit, capital needs to maintain a skilled labor force to work increasingly complex means of production but at the same time, as a means of securing high rates of profit, it must maintain such a workforce while still keeping the social cost of its reproduction low. Delectable feminism helps with this task by focusing on strategies for women that are aimed, on the one hand, at expanding the market by creating new "needs" so that workers can absorb some of the cost of "overproduction" and, on the other, at reducing the social cost of the laboring population so that wages can be lowered and the rate of exploitation can be raised. It articulates a new "ethics" for transnational capitalism that will enable women of the North to adjust to the specific historical labor needs that capitalism requires of them now in order to maintain profit.

#### The alternative’s secularist stance is key. It’s not an argument for leaving your religion at the door but religion should not dominate how we conceive of the state and the law. Rather, it’s necessary to expand things like worker participation. It fights against conservatism that Islamic feminism espouses which makes the expansion of capitalist markets inevitable. Religion is the opiate of the masses and used as a divisive tool to prop up even more capitalism.

Moghadam 2002 [Valentine M., Department of Sociology at Illinois State University, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate,” in *Signs* 27.4]

What are some elements of a system of governance and a legal system that could ensure greater social, gender, religious, and ethnic equality? Some of these changes have been suggested by certain intellectuals within the reform movement.32 Here I will offer some needed changes from a secular feminist (Marxist-feminist) perspective. Religious doctrine should not be the basis of laws, policies, or institutions. Iran’s constitution (or any other constitution) should not state that “Islam [or Christianity or Judaism or Hinduism] is the official [or state or national] religion.” Family law should not derive from religious texts, whether in Iran or in Israel. Blasphemy laws should be removed, and religion should be the subject of historical and critical inquiry. All citizens should be equal before the law, with equal rights and obligations. Civil, political, and social rights of citizens should be protected by the state and by the institutions of civil society. This includes worker participation in decision making and an active role for independent unions, professional associations, citizen groups, and so on. It should be noted that Islam, like other monotheistic religions, does have humane, compassionate, and egalitarian aspects. These may inspire civil codes, political processes, social policies, and economic institutions. For example, the social justice foundations of religious thought represent an important balance to the harsh discipline of the capitalist market. The ban on usury in Islam and Catholicism is in conflict with capitalism’s creation of wealth through nonproductive financial transactions and speculation, and this, to my mind, is progressive and should be emphasized. Religious belief should be respected, and religious institutions should have a place in civil society, but religion should not dominate the state and the law.

## 1NR

### Word PIC

#### . Essentialism. ‘Islamophobia’ portrays all Muslims as defined by Islam—locks in discrimination and anti-Muslim alarmism

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(Fred, “`Islamophobia’ reconsidered,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Volume 22, Number 5, p. 892-902, September)

No subject in contemporary public discussion has attracted more confused discussion than that of relations between ‘Islam’ and the West. Whether it be the discussion of relations between Muslim states and non- Muslim countries, or that of the relations between non-Muslims and Muslims within Western countries, the tendency has on both sides been, with some exceptions , towards alarmism and simplification. Alarmism has concerned the ‘threat’ which, from one side, ‘Islam’ poses to the non- Muslim world, and on the other, which ‘the West’ poses to Muslims. Non- Muslim simplification involves many obvious issues: terrorism – as if most Muslims are terrorists or most terrorists are Muslims; the degree of aggressiveness found in the Muslim world and the responsibility of Muslims for this; the willingness of Muslims to allow for diversity, debate, respect for human rights. It is not only the sensationalist media, but also writers with an eye to current anxieties of the reading public, such as V. S. Naipaul and Samuel Huntington, who reinforce such misrepresentation. Muslim simplification is itself two-sided: on the one hand, a stereotyping of the ‘West’; on the other, the assertion of a unitary identity for all Muslims, and of a unitary interpretation of text and culture. The core simplification involves these very terms themselves: ‘the West’ is not a valid aggregation of the modern world and lends itself far too easily to monist, conspiratorial presentations of political and social interaction. But nor is the term ‘Islam’ a valid shorthand for summarizing how a billion Muslims, divided into over éfty states, and into myriad ethnicities and social groups, relate to the contemporary world, to each other or to the non-Muslim world. To get away from such simpliécations is, however, virtually impossible, since both those opposed to ‘Islam’ and those invoking it adhere to such labels. Moreover, as much of this literature shows, those who are most intent on critiquing standard Western prejudices about the Muslim world themselves fall back on another set of simplifcations. Instead of fearing or hating anti-Muslim stereotypes, we are now invited to respect, understand, study ‘Islam’. Islamophobia, Eurocentrism, stereotyping The literature under review here ranges across several aspects of this question. The Runnymede and Wilton Park reports identify misinterpretations, above all in the West, of the Muslim world and advocate a more tolerant, informed, relation to the Muslim world. They reèect an approach derived, on the one hand, from race relations and, on the other, from inter-faith dialogue. They both set current frictions in the context of the long historical relations between Muslims and the Christian world, both identify the role of the media in reinforcing stereotypes, both advocate greater discussion between communities. Most signiécantly, perhaps, they accept the term ‘Islam’ as a denomination of the primary identity of those who are Muslims; they avoid discussion of the diversities within Muslim societies, on ethnic grounds or on the interpretation of the Muslim tradition and on its application to the contemporary world.

#### The term is key—it both homogenizes oppression AND prevents criticism

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(Javier Rosón, “Discrepancies Around the Use of the Term “Islamophobia”,” HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, VIII, 2, Fall)

But we cannot put aside the ‘religious facet’ of Islam and the latter’s involvement in the religious, social, political and cultural aspects of Muslim individuals and communities. From the moment in which religious connotation enters into play another series of discrepancies of a ‘religious’ nature arises. In this regard, ‘religious criticism’ basically puts forward two postures: on the one hand, that Islamophobia can be used by some Muslims or communities to forbid all criticism of Islam as a religion, i.e., so that the religion they practice is not questioned in any way; on the other stand those who hold that the term may be misleading, as it implicitly presumes the pre-eminence of religious discrimination (phobia against a single, homogenous and unchangeable Islam), when there are other forms of discrimination which can be ethnic, ‘racial’ or class racism, etc., with much greater relevance or representation. For this reason the religious connotation which can accompany the term Islamophobia is rejected, given that in different countries religion is often seen as an obstacle to integration10. Criticism on this point is likewise related to aspects such as laicism or the construction of a secular society, wherein it is held that the representation of religion should mainly be undertaken in a private context.

### Case

#### Islamic feminism risks reproducing the worst repressions of Islam as a state-centric ideology controlled completely by men and elites. Islamic feminist studies don’t take into account the perspective of exiles and silence radical criticism of social conditions and gender relations in Islamic countries.

Moghadam 2002 [Valentine M., Department of Sociology at Illinois State University, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate,” in *Signs* 27.4]

Whereas Shahidian has been especially critical of Tohidi, Shahrzad Mojab has focused on Najmabadi’s writings on Islamic feminism. In an article published in the Persian-language magazine Arash, Mojab criticizes Najmabadi for suggesting that Zanan is the new “democratic forum” and that it can help to feminize democracy. She disputes Najmabadi’s hopeful prognosis about the reinterpretation of Islamic texts and stresses that the ruling religious elite can dismiss, delegitimize, or prohibit radical or feminist reinterpretations. What Iran’s Islamic feminists have achieved is, at any rate, quite limited in content and consequence. Real change—real democratization—will come about outside of the religious framework, writes Mojab (1999). Some Iranian leftists in exile have been very vocal in opposing Islamic feminism. Left-opposition newspapers and magazines have carried articles describing the phenomenon and rejecting it as illusory or as legitimizing Islamic rule. Representative of this line of thought is an editorial titled “The Limits of Islamic Feminism” in Iran Bulletin (Kia 1994), an Englishlanguage magazine published in England with ties to the socialist group Rah-e Kargar. The basic premise is that no reform is possible in an Islamic legal and political system where “the very structure of power is male dominated to an absolute degree, backed by the Constitution, an all male clerical system ruling the country, and a Shari’a written for an era long past its sell-by date.” The author, M. Kia, argues that the Islamic reformist discourse is not identical to liberation theology but derives from “a religion in which the role of women is clearly stated.” This stated role includes women’s inferior status with respect to marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and court witnessing, the ban on women judges, and mandated veiling. The article notes that under pressure from women a debate has been under way and some political changes have been introduced, but the reforms have been limited and do nothing more than return Iranian gender codes to their prerevolutionary situation, which is still considerably behind most countries with similar economic status. Any reform movement or discourse that is carried out within the framework of Islamic law and that takes for granted the legitimacy and permanence of an Islamic state and of Qur’anic edicts is at best a very limited project and at worst a way of legitimizing the Islamic legal, political, and moral framework. With respect to Islamic feminism, “it would thus seem rather naïve to place too much hope in the ‘internal’ opposition to effect significant change in the conditions of women in Iran” (Kia 1994, 20–21). Another argument, made mostly against the academic supporters of Islamic feminism, has surfaced in a number of Iranian seminars and conferences, mainly on the part of left-wing expatriates who remain affiliated with proscribed political organizations and therefore have not traveled back to Iran since the revolution. They complain that proponents of Islamic feminists—insisting as they do on the need for fieldwork, empirical research, and direct experience in Iran—delegitimize the analyses and perspectives of exiles. As such, they effectively close off debate and silence the critics of social conditions, gender relations, and Islamic feminism in Iran.22

#### Islamic feminism is deeply conservative—working within the Islamic system risks reproducing the repressive aspects of Islam.

Moghadam 2002 [Valentine M., Department of Sociology at Illinois State University, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate,” in *Signs* 27.4]

Among both independent and state feminists in the IRI are believing women who seek to counter patriarchal religious interpretations and highlight egalitarian or woman-centered understandings. I am sympathetic to the discursive strategy of these Islamic feminists, but I am concerned about the focus on the “correct” reading of the Islamic texts. A reasonable concern is that, so long as Islamic feminists remain focused on theological arguments rather than socioeconomic and political questions, and so long as their point of reference is the Qur’an rather than universal standards, their impact will be limited at best. At worst, their strategy could reinforce the legitimacy of the Islamic system, help to reproduce it, and undermine secular alternatives. But this worst-case scenario very likely will not materialize, because most Islamic feminists combine their religious reinterpretations with a recognition of universal standards, such as the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Nevertheless, it is indeed the case that Islamic feminists, and especially the state feminists, are situated within and firmly accept the legal framework, institutions, and discursive universe of Islam and the IRI. For example, Jamileh Kadivar—reformist, parliamentarian, and professor—staunchly defended “Islamic human rights” at a contentious conference in Berlin in early April 2000. A year earlier, however, she had incurred the wrath of conservatives by calling for an abrogation of men’s right to unilateral divorce and polygamy. Such inconsistencies are common among Islamic feminists. S I G N S Summer 2002 ❙ 1159 In some ways, Iran’s Islamic feminists are not substantially different from liberal feminists, particularly those in the United States, who work within the existing political system and seek to improve women’s positions though the discursive framework of liberal capitalism. Of course, the substance of their respective gender critiques is different, and they work within two entirely different political and legal environments. But both groups of feminists work within and maintain the legitimacy of their respective political systems. Shahidian has criticized Iran’s Islamic feminists for their failure to take up such issues as homosexuality and personal autonomy. And yet, U.S. liberal feminists have not called for economic and political transformation. The demands for sexual rights and equal opportunities in education and employment are entirely compatible with the capitalist system. What liberal feminists have not called for is a change in the system of taxation and in development policy that would alter American foreign policy and the distribution of wealth, transforming the lives of low-income women in the United States and elsewhere. In fact, one may suggest provocatively that those Islamic feminists who question the exclusive right of clerics and the faqih to interpret the Islamic texts and to define and implement Islamic jurisprudence are more subversive to the existing political system than are their U.S. liberal-feminist counterparts.